We study a Gentzen style sequent calculus where the formulas on the left and right of the turnstile need not necessarily come from the same logical system. Such a sequent can be seen as a consequence between di erent domains of reasoning. We discuss the ingredients needed to set up the logic generalized in this fashion.
Introduction
This paper attempts to provide a new analysis of Samson Abramsky's Domain Theory in Logical Form Abr87, Abr91] . The overall aim is to isolate precisely the key ingredients necessary for a Logic of Finite Observations Vic89,Smy92b].
Since we choose to emphasize the logic rather than the semantics our main objects of study are sequents in tradition of Proof Theory Gen34]: 1 ; : : : ; n` 1 ; : : : ; m The connectives are restricted to conjunction and disjunction, that is, positive logic. This is in line with previous work on observational logic. We go beyond this in three respects. Firstly, we leave out the identity axiom scheme, ` . This is justi ed by the fact that observing a certain state of the world does not always imply that the corresponding proposition is actually true, the reason being that our instruments for observing the world are not precise enough. Measuring physical constants is an example. Secondly, we allow the formulas i in a sequent to be from a di erent language than the formulas j . Technically, this seems admissible because none of the rules for disjunction or conjunction mixes formulas from di erent sides of sequents. However, the cut rule has to be adjusted to this new situation. As far as observational logic is concerned it seems a common situation that there is a linguistic di erence between the observations one might make and the conclusions to be drawn from them. Thirdly, we allow classical sequents following the example of Gentzen's famous treatment of classical logic. At rst glance there seems to be no point in this because there is no di erence between intuitionistic positive logic and classical positive logic. However, this formulation will emphasize the rather pretty self-symmetry of the whole set-up.
Many aspects of this paper are a direct consequence of these three special properties of the logical system. Leaving out the identity axiom, for example, necessitates to check carefully how to retain some of its essential consequences. Doing so, we discover interpolation axioms akin to the interpolation property of the approximation (way-below) relation known from continuous domains GHK + 80, AJ94] . Allowing sequents to`connect' formulas from di erent logical languages suggests to study a category with sets of sequents (closed under the logical rules) as arrows. We call such sets of sequents consequence relations. The cut rule serves nicely as a composition of consequence relations but we have to work somewhat harder to nd the identities. The notion of object we end up with shows close resemblance with strong proximity lattices which were introduced in JS96a, JS96b] . While the latter were motivated by purely topological considerations (in the vain of Stone duality) the present paper establishes their logical proof-theoretic content. In particular, this constitutes an independent justi cation for the two axioms which distinguish strong proximity lattices from the structures studied in Smy92a]. The precise connection is laid out in Sections 6 and 7 below.
Our symmetric`classical' presentation of sequents allows us to shed new light on the open and the compact saturated interpretation of tokens in strong proximity lattices. In JS96a] open sets are coded as round ideals and compact saturated sets as round lters. In the present, logical reading, ideals appear naturally on the left of the turnstile, lters on the right. Besides illustrating once again the duality between open and compact subsets this now suggests to read the complement of a compact saturated set as negative information encoded in a token. Although we excluded negation from observational logic, we seem to get a weak form of negation for free! There is also a semantic reading of our morphisms, that is, consequence relations. They correspond to maps from a coherent space to the Smyth power space of another one, i.e. they can be seen as certain relations between these spaces. Composition corresponds to composition in the Kleisli category associated with the Smyth power monad. Ordinary functions can be captured as well but only at the price of sacri cing symmetry.
In the last section we study cut elimination in the context of positive logic and our new form of the cut rule. The proofs are fairly simple when compared to the intricacies of Gentzens's original cut elimination theorem, but the result is nonetheless quite powerful. It allows us to describe domain constructions in purely logical terms, avoiding the translation from the logic to topological spaces which is at the heart of the proofs in Abr87,Abr91]. We illustrate the technique for the construction of product.
The paper draws on a number of concepts from the existing literature. We recommend AJ94] as a reference for notions in domain theory and Stone duality, JS96a] for coherent spaces, and TS96] for proof theory.
A typed propositional logic
We are considering a situation where inferences are to be drawn between di erent logical systems. We write 1 ; : : : ; n` 1 ; : : : ; m as in standard proof theory and we read this as \if all i hold then at least one j holds", as usual, but unlike in normal sequent calculus we intend to keep the formulas on the left separate from those on the right. There are many situations where such a separation might be desirable or even necessary. We discuss three of them.
Consider ordinary propositional logic. Someone could say \It is very cold in here. I need to put on a sweater." thus drawing an inference from an observation about the temperature to a certain action. Note that there is nothing`logical' about this inference and, indeed, someone else might say \It is very cold in here. I will turn on the heating." The inference relation in this example is a subjective one and there can be many di erent such relations. Although it is common to combine arbitrary propositions in logic we may wish to distinguish in a situation like this between propositions about the state of the environment and propositions about actions of a certain individual.
A second example is given by Hoare Logic. When we write a triple like fx > 0g x := ?x fx < 0g
we certainly do not mean that x > 0 logically implies x < 0, rather, we read this as \If x > 0 holds before the execution of x := ?x then x < 0 holds afterwards." In this example every program fragment will give rise to a characteristic relationship between preconditions and postconditions. The logical formulas are (typically) all about the contents of program variables and there is no syntactic reason to keep pre-and postconditions separate, as in the previous example, but the separation becomes necessary because the formulas refer to the state at di erent times.
Our third example is from observation logic, Abr87, Vic89, Smy92b] . In many situations, in computing in particular, there is no di erence between what we observe and what we hold to be true. In more real life situations this is not so. We can observe that the thermometer reads 15 Celsius but we do not necessarily believe that this is actually the case. If the thermometer works well then we perhaps infer from this observation that the true temperature is somewhere between 14:5 and 15:5 Celsius. We arrive at a logic where (`the observation') does not necessarily imply (`the belief').
Technically, we allow formulas on the left and formulas on the right of the turnstile to come from di erent logical systems. These systems can be quite arbitrary; all we require is the presence of conjunction and disjunction, and the units ? (falsity) and > (truth). Each system embodies a certain`logic' in the sense that certain formulas imply others. We capture the internal logic by referring to arbitrary (2; 2; 0; 0)-algebras instead of syntactically de ned set of formulas. Such an algebra, for example, could have been obtained as the Lindenbaum algebra by factoring the set of formulas of the system by logical equivalence. At the other extreme, the syntactically de ned set of formulas for a logical system can be regarded as a such an algebra, providing the logic contains the connectives of positive logic. Henceforth we will use the expressions \element of a (2; 2; 0; 0)-algebra" and \formula" interchangeably.
We require that the comma which separates formulas on the left refers to conjunction and the comma on the right refers to disjunction. The logical part of our system is given by the rules where a double line indicates that the rule can be used in both directions. The`backward' rules are not present in the usual sequent calculus since there they are consequences of the identity and the cut rule. The di erence in character between the`forward' and the`backward' rules will become apparent in Section 8
Note that we cannot refer to implication or negation in the logical systems as the corresponding rules would make it necessary to transfer formulas from one side to the other. However, the logical systems themselves may still support these connectives.
On the side of structural rules we will only refer to weakening ?` (W ) ? 0 ; ?` ; 0 and keep exchange and contraction implicit. Thus we are working with sets of formulas rather than sequences. The`forward' rules (R?) and (L>) are special cases of weakening.
As the examples above suggest, this calculus is not about nding tautologies but rather, each relation`between formulas of two logical systems embodies a particular, possibly subjective, inference. Whatever the reasons are for holding such an inference as true, there are other inferences which should in such a situation also be held as true. The rules above formalize precisely this reasoning: If ; ; ? entails then ^ ; ? should also entail , and so on. Our objects of study are therefore relations between sets of formulas which are closed under the rules from above. We x this in a de nition:
De nition 2.1 For two algebras hL;^; _; >; ?i and hM;^0; _ 0 ; > 0 ; ? 0 i of type If, according to a consequence relation`, the formula implies , and if, according to a second relation`0, implies , then it makes sense to combine these two inferences and to say that implies according to the compositioǹ `0 of the two given consequence relations. This composition corresponds to the composition of relations and functions in an obvious way. However, consequence relations relate sets of formulas rather than single formulas and the meaning of a set as an antecedent is di erent from the meaning of the same set as a succedent. A logically correct composition is given by the following rule 1 :
?` 1 . . .
subject to the condition that for every choice function f 2 Q i i there exists an index j so that j ff 1 ; : : : ; f n g.
We call it cut composition in reference to Gentzen's classical cut rule. The intuition behind this cut rule and its side-condition is that if ? entails all the i 's then at least one formula in each i is true. If for every possibility, coded by a choice function, these formulas cover one of the j 's then ? also entails .
The only problem with the cut rule is that it looks rather asymmetric whereas the other rules are perfectly symmetric. That is to say if we take a 3 A proof-theoretic analysis of identities We are interested in constructing a category of consequence relations. As a rst step we observe that Cut-Comp preserves consequence relations and that it is associative. Lemma 3.1 Given consequence relations`from L to M and`0 from M to N the sequents ?(` `0) that arise from the rule Cut-Comp form a consequence relation.
Lemma 3.2 The composition of consequence relations induced by Cut-Comp is associative.
It remains to nd identities. One might be tempted to employ ordinary logical implication between formulas of one world for this. However, this is somewhat against the spirit of this paper where we want to suppress purely logical equivalences in order to exhibit the properties of inferences which are, in some sense, subjective or observational. As we have argued, for such inferences it is not necessarily the case that a formula implies itself. That is, we refuse the identity axioms
We reserve the symbol to represent a consequence relation that has identical source and target algebra L.
On ; then there exists 0 2 L so that ? ; 0 and 0 .
Of course, if the identity axioms of sequent calculus are adopted then interpolation is trivial. Looking at this from the other end, we can say that interpolation will provide us with some of the consequences of the identity axiom scheme. From this, we take our cue to de ne the objects of a category.
De nition 3.7 hL;^; _; >; ?; i is a coherent sequent calculus if is a consequence relation from L to L such that has interpolants and is closed under Cut.
The relations are in fact idempotents but not identities for all consequence relations. This is not surprising because, as yet, we do not have any axioms that make sure that identities and other consequence relations interact in a sensible way. Say that a consequence relation`from L to M is compatible with L and M if L `=`=` M De nition 3.8 The category MLS (for Multi Lingual Sequents) has coherent sequent calculi as objects and compatible consequence relations between them as arrows.
The facts that L is self-compatible on both sides, and that composition of compatible consequent relations preserves compatibility are both evident from the de nition. From Lemma 2.2 and the preceding discussion it is clear that MLS is self-dual.
The properties of idempotent consequence relations are inherited by compatible consequence relations as follows: A di erent perspective on the de nition of MLS is given by the following. One can restrict the logic to situations where a proposition does imply itself and thus adopt the identity rule for all consequence relations from a logical system to itself. As the identity morphism on a (2; 2; 0; 0)-algebra one can then take the smallest consequence relation generated by the identity rules, which will yield precisely the logically valid sequents of the system. Compatibility is not an issue and one obtains immediately a (self-dual) category RMLS (Re exive Multi Lingual Sequents). Now, the category MLS, that we are interested in, is precisely the category one obtains from RMLS by splitting the idempotents, a technique which is well-known from category theory, FS90, 1.28].
It Lemma 4.7 For sets X L, the following are equivalent.
(i) X is a meet-prime element of Filt(L);
(ii) X is a lter, ? = 2 X and _ 2 X if and only if 2 X or 2 X; (iii) X \ 6 = ;, for a nite , if and only if ? L for some ? n X.
The dual conditions for meet-prime elements of Idl(L) also are equivalent.
A set satisfying any of these equivalent conditions is called a prime lter. A set satisfying the dual conditions is called a prime ideal. Note that in (3) we are neither assuming X to be a lter nor do we refer to the operations of the algebra.
Consistency
Consider the role that lters and ideals play in logic. Roughly, a lter corresponds to a theory. One typically says that a lter (or theory) is consistent if it is not the entire language. Then one formulation of soundness and completeness has it that a lter is consistent if and only if it has a model. The latter means essentially, that it is contained in a prime lter. But closer inspection of the proofs of completeness theorems, say for Gentzen's system K Gen34], shows that more is proved. In particular, we have nearly complete freedom to choose, apart from the formulas in F, what formulas are not to be satis ed in a particular model.
Say that a pair of sets (X; Y ) for X L and Y M is`-consistent provided that for all ? n X and n Y , it is the case that ? 6 . The idea here is to understand X as a set of formulas that`hold' in L and Y as a set of formulas that do not hold in M. So the least we should expect is that does not contradict this understanding. Consistency has to do essentially with lters and ideals as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5.1 For every consequence relation`from L to M the following are equivalent: The equivalent conditions (8) and (9), on the other hand, correspond to completeness, as mentioned above. We will come back to these conditions when we discuss the topological semantics of coherent sequent calculi.
The machinery provided by the previous lemma, in particular the equivalence of the rst four conditions, allows us to improve on Lemma 4.6. 
Algebraization of observation logic: Proximity lattices
Before we continue with the proof theory of coherent sequent calculi and compatible consequence relations we approach the issue from a completely di erent angle. To this end we review some of the results reported in JS96a].
De nition 6.1 A strong proximity lattice is a distributive bounded lattice (B; _;^; ?; >) together with a binary transitive relation satisfying = . The algebraic structure given by the lattice and the approximation structure are connected by the following four axioms: Strong proximity lattices and (weak) approximable relations form a category SPL (w) ; the order of approximation on an object acts as identity. Now, we want to compare this with coherent sequent calculi and consequence relations. It is straight-forward to see from the respective de nitions that ?
_ makes a strong proximity lattice into a coherent sequent calculus and that weak approximable relations likewise translate into compatible consequence relations.
In the other direction, we factor a given (2; 2; 0; 0)-algebra with interpolative consequence relation by the equations of distributive lattices. A number of calculations show that is invariant with respect to these equations and we can therefore without ambiguity de ne a consequence relation on the quotient algebra by setting following:
The terminology`arithmetic' is taken from AJ94,GHK + 80] and means that the lattice is distributive and that x y; z implies x y^z. The Stone duality of arithmetic lattices is well understood; they are precisely the openset lattices of coherent spaces (sometimes also called stably locally compact spaces), AJ94, Theorem 7.2.19]. As was shown in JS96a], this duality can be explained at the level of proximity lattices. Again, a similar statement is true for coherent sequent calculi: Proposition 7.2 Let L be a coherent sequent calculus and let spec(L) be the set of prime lters on L. The sets O := fF 2 spec(L) j 2 Fg with 2 L generate a topology on spec(L). The resulting space is coherent.
As in propositional logic, a prime lter on a coherent sequent calculus represents a model. The spectrum spec(L), then, is the space of all models, and every formula of L de nes a subset of models, namely, those in which is true. The de nition of the topology on spec(L) is such that all these extents of formulas are open. In the classical setting of Boolean algebras and Stone spaces the extents are also compact. This is not the case here. However, every formula has a canonical compact subset associated with it:
The logic is translated into set-theoretic operations both through the open and the compact interpretation: Proposition 7.3 The following are true for a coherent sequent calculus L:
] that open and compact sets need to be combined in order to reconstruct the logic from the spectrum. Theorem 7.4 For a coherent space X the following de nes a strong proximity lattice:
? := (;; ;), > := (X; X)
This is a representation of X, i.e. X ' spec(B). The spectra of strong proximity lattices are precisely the coherent spaces.
Here (X) denotes the set of open subsets of X and K(X) the set of those compact subsets which are saturated in the sense that they equal the intersection of their neighborhoods.
Section 5 It was shown in JS96a] that the category of proximity lattices and approximable relations is equivalent to the category of coherent spaces and continuous functions. The question arises how weak approximable relations (or, equivalently, compatible consequence relations) can be captured on the side of the spectrum.
Given a compatible consequence relation`between coherent sequent calculi L and M, one can de ne a relation R`between the two spectra as follows: We can reformulate this further: For a coherent space X the ordered set (K(X); ) of compact saturated subsets is always an arithmetic lattice. Equipped with the Scott-topology it is therefore again coherent, AJ94, Section 7.2.7]. A continuous function between coherent spaces lifts to a mapping between the compact set lattices. It has been shown in JS96b, Lemma 2] that this mapping is Scott-continuous. It follows that K de nes an endofunctor on COH. This functor is also part of a monad. Its`unit' takes a point x to "x, and its`multiplication' maps an element A 2 K(K(X)) to S A 2 K(X) (see Sch93, Proposition 7.21]). As our main result of this section we get that the category of compatible theories is exactly the Kleisli category of this monad:
Theorem 7.6 The categories MLS and SPL w are equivalent to the Kleisli category COH K of the Smyth power monad (K; "; S ).
Cut elimination
The famous Cut Elimination Theorem of Gentzen Gen34] states that every valid sequent in the sequent calculus can be derived without employing the cut rule. Sequents in our setting, however, are not about absolute validity but about derivability of sequents from assumed sequents. The analogous theorem for this situation says that in every such derivation cuts between arbitrary sequents can be eliminated in favour of cuts between assumed sequents. We will exhibit a similar result which applies to the rule Cut ; ; ?` It is now the right moment to make a distinction between these two kinds of rules. Call a rule positive if it introduces a connective into a sequent and negative otherwise. The positive rules of Section 2 are precisely those which are read from top to bottom. If R is any relation between nite sets of elements of (2; 2; 0; 0)-algebras denote with R + the smallest such relation which contains R and is closed under application of positive rules.
For algebras themselves we say that B L is a generating set if the smallest subalgebra B + of L containing B is L itself. This generation process can also be described by nitary rules: If B L and C M and if`is a consequence relation from L to M, write`j B;C to abbreviate`\P f (B) P f (C), the restriction of`to sequents made up entirely from the respective generators.
We now come to the rst important lemma relating sets of generators for algebras and freely generated consequence relations.
Lemma 8.1 If B L and C M are generating sets, and`is a consequence relation, then`= (`j B;C ) + . The lemma shows that we can restrict our attention to the behaviour of consequence relations on generators for the algebras involved. In the remainder of this section we examine how far this idea can be pushed. We start with the composition of consequence relations via Cut Theorem 8.7 A binary relation on nite sets from a term algebra L over generators B is a coherent sequent calculus if and only if j B;B has interpolants and is closed under Cut. As an example application of these results, consider the construction of a binary product in MLS. Given L and M, take B(L M) to be the disjoint union of L and M. Here we denote members of B(L M) by : for 2 L and 0 : for 2 M. Take L M to be the term algebra generated by B(L M).
To de ne an identity arrow for L M, it su ces to describe its behavior on B(L M). For The projection from L M to L is de ned by behavior on the generators B(L M) and L. Namely, ? L : ?` : The projection to M is de ned similarly. Again, the conditions of compatibility for` and` 0 can be read directly from the coherence of`L and M so`+ and`+ 0 are compatible consequence relations. Now suppose that`f and`g are compatible consequence relations from N to L and N to M, respectively. De ne`h f;gi by ?`f ?`h f;gi :
?`g ?`h f;gi 0 : Now,`+ hf;gi `+ = (`h f;gi ` ) + , so we have only to note that the right hand sides of sequents in`h f;gi are only of two forms: : for n L and 0 : for n M. Furthermore, the left hand sides of sequents in` are all of the form : ? for ? n L. That is,`h f;gi ` is exactly` M =`f. Thus (`h f;gi ` ) + =`f. Evidently,`+ hf;gi is the unique consequence relation for which`f = (`h f;gi ` ) + and`g = (`h f;gi ` 0 ) + as any such relation is determined by its behavior on B(L M) and must agree with`h f;gi on B(L M).
A similar argument shows that by taking L 1 to be the free algebra on no generators, we get a terminal object. Furthermore, the construction above obviously extends to arbitrary products: Given an indexed set of coherent sequent calculi fL i g i2I , de ne Q i2I L i as the algebra freely generated by the disjoint union`i 2I L i , writing i : when 2 L i . Then Q i2I L i is de ned exactly as before as are i and`h f i i i2I . Also, because MLS is self dual, the exact same constructions yield coproducts.
